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ABSTRACT—Establishment Clause jurisprudence is notoriously 
convoluted. In a recent case, Doe v. Elmbrook School District, the Seventh 
Circuit found unconstitutional a public school district’s practice of 
conducting high school graduation ceremonies in the sanctuary of an 
evangelical Christian church. The case illustrated the particular difficulty of 
assessing the constitutionality of government activity that takes place in a 
house of worship. This Note suggests that refocusing Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence on liberty of conscience is a historically appropriate and 
simpler way of measuring potential Establishment Clause violations, both 
when religion invades government and when government goes to church. 
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I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American 
people which declared that their legislature should “make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof,” thus building a wall of separation between Church & State. 




He attended worship services in the Capitol building,1 but Thomas 
Jefferson famously interpreted the First Amendment as “a wall of 
separation between church and state.”2 Although not all scholars agree that 
Jefferson’s interpretation of the Establishment Clause3 is accurate,4 his idea 
of the wall of separation endures, and just how high or thick or 
impermeable that “wall” ought to be has eluded scholars, jurists, and other 
state actors for more than two hundred years.5 Today, most Establishment 
 
† PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 1 (2002) (quoting Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Stephen S. Nelson, a Comm. of the 
Danbury Baptist Ass’n in the State of Conn. (Jan. 1, 1802) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I), in Daniel 
L. Dreisbach, “Sowing Useful Truths and Principles”: The Danbury Baptists, Thomas Jefferson, and 
the “Wall of Separation,” 39 J. CHURCH & ST. 455, 468–69 (1997) (footnote omitted)). 
1 William A. Glaser, Comment, Worshiping Separation: Worship in Limited Public Forums and the 
Establishment Clause, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 1053, 1054 (2011). 
2 Thomas E. Buckley, S.J., The Religious Rhetoric of Thomas Jefferson, in THE FOUNDERS ON GOD 
AND GOVERNMENT 53, 71 (Daniel L. Dreisbach et al. eds., 2004). 
3 “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
4 See, e.g., Robert G. Natelson, The Original Meaning of the Establishment Clause, 14 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 73, 77–78 (2005) (arguing that relying on Madison’s and Jefferson’s philosophies to 
interpret the Religion Clauses is “wildly inaccurate” and Jefferson’s direct role in the drafting and 
adoption of the First Amendment was “rather insignificant”); contra Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 
1, 10–13 (1947). 
5 The proscriptions embodied in the Establishment Clause apply equally to state legislatures under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
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Clause issues arise when religion enters the governmental sphere—for 
example, in the context of prayer in public schools,6 government funding 
for parochial schools,7 and displays of the Ten Commandments in 
courthouses8 or public parks.9 
But the Establishment Clause applies equally to government activity in 
church. Just as religion can invade government, so, too, can the government 
violate the Establishment Clause by entering religions’ hallowed ground. In 
the summer of 2012, the Seventh Circuit held in Doe v. Elmbrook School 
District that the Establishment Clause forbids a public high school from 
conducting its graduation ceremony “in the sanctuary of a non-
denominational Christian church.”10 The case highlighted the question of 
when a state entity can and cannot conduct government business in a house 
of worship. The Seventh Circuit did not articulate a clear standard for 
resolving that question. 
The government’s ability to conduct business in a house of worship 
affects more than just the location of public schools’ commencement 
ceremonies, as in Elmbrook School District. Many churches function as 
polling places.11 Judges frequently order defendants to participate in overtly 
religious twelve-step programs.12 The list of government activities 
occurring in churches goes on. Do these practices also violate the 
Establishment Clause? Does allowing graduations and other civic 
ceremonies to take place in houses of worship give too much control to 
private religious entities? Should a court ever bless government entities 
acting in religious spaces? 
 
6 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 599 (1992) (holding that clergy offering prayer at 
an official public school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause). 
7 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 609–11 (1971) (finding the First Amendment to 
prohibit a Pennsylvania statute providing public funds for nonpublic schoolteacher “salaries, textbooks, 
and instructional materials”). 
8 See, e.g., McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 851–58 (2005) (approving of the grant 
of a preliminary injunction barring the display of large, readily visible copies of the Ten 
Commandments in two county courthouses in the state of Kentucky). Interestingly, a frieze in the 
Supreme Court of the United States’ courtroom featuring historical lawmakers includes a depiction of 
the Ten Commandments. Id. at 874. The constitutionality of that particular display has not been 
contested in court. 
9 See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681–83 (2005) (plurality opinion) (concluding that 
the Establishment Clause permitted a display of the Ten Commandments on the grounds of the Texas 
State Capitol). 
10 687 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). 
11 See, e.g., City of Chicago Tentative/Preliminary List of Polling Places for the March 18, 2014 
Primary Election, BOARD OF ELECTION COMMISSIONERS FOR THE CITY OF CHICAGO (2013), available 
at http://perma.cc/CT4G-FUDN. 
12 See Derek P. Apanovitch, Note, Religion and Rehabilitation: The Requisition of God by the 
State, 47 DUKE L.J. 785, 785–86, 790–91 (1998). 
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This Note suggests that the Establishment Clause should be read in 
concert with the Free Exercise Clause13 and offers an approach to 
determining when government activity can and cannot take place in church. 
Reading the Establishment Clause as forbidding unreasonable impingement 
upon liberty of conscience offers a historically accurate and widely 
applicable approach to future Establishment Clause cases arising in houses 
of worship and elsewhere. This reading is consistent with the principles the 
Establishment Clause was originally meant to protect—namely, the 
freedom of religious conscience, which “was the first individual right to be 
widely regarded as inalienable.”14 
Part I closely examines Doe v. Elmbrook School District to 
demonstrate the difficulty of navigating current Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence. This look at Elmbrook School District highlights the 
particular risk of impinging upon liberty of conscience when government 
activity occurs in a house of worship. Part I then looks briefly at current 
trends in religious and civic participation in the United States, suggesting 
that houses of worship are becoming the best, and in some cases, only 
available spaces for traditional civic activities. Next, Part II provides a 
broad overview of recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Part III 
explores the origins of the Establishment Clause and the Founders’ 
justifications for and perceptions of the Clause, as well as the protections it 
was meant to afford. Finally, Part IV articulates a way to read the 
Establishment Clause in concert with the Free Exercise Clause to focus on 
protecting liberty of conscience. Courts should interpret both Clauses to 
protect liberty of conscience—the freedom of thought, morality, and faith. 
It then considers whether and when the Establishment Clause permits state 
activity in church, concluding that when a government activity occurring in 
a house of worship restricts a reasonable person’s ability to make choices 
about matters of morality and religion, such activity violates the 
Establishment Clause. 
I. GOVERNMENT IN CHURCH 
The text of the Establishment Clause forbids Congress from making 
any law “respecting an establishment of religion.”15 While the most 
attention-grabbing Establishment Clause cases involve religion entering a 
 
13 “Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of religion] . . . .” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
14 Steven G. Calabresi et al., State Bills of Rights in 1787 and 1791: What Individual Rights Are 
Really Deeply Rooted in American History and Tradition?, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1451, 1470 (2012) 
(citing Barry Alan Shain & Rogers M. Smith, Introduction to THE NATURE OF RIGHTS AT THE 
AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 1, 2 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007)). 
15 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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secular government environment such as a school,16 when the government 
goes to church, the values underlying the Establishment Clause are 
especially in danger of being undermined. Specifically, government 
activity in a house of worship risks compromising the principle of liberty of 
conscience embodied in the Establishment Clause.17 With a petition for a 
writ of certiorari pending in the case,18 Doe v. Elmbrook School District 
provides one recent example of government activity in church. The case 
calls for a broader discussion of what the Establishment Clause requires. 
Whether religion enters a government sphere or the government conducts 
some business in a house of worship, the Establishment Clause’s demand is 
the same: protection of individuals’ freedom of conscience. Examining 
government activity in church can help clarify the doctrinal confusion 
currently masking the purity of the First Amendment. Doing so will help to 
return the unmoored Establishment Clause doctrine to its original theory 
about the relationship between government and its people: government 
should not prescribe a particular religion or practice thereof. 
A. A Close Look at Doe v. Elmbrook School District 
In Doe v. Elmbrook School District, a divided en banc Seventh Circuit 
found unconstitutional the practice of conducting a public high school’s 
graduation ceremonies in the sanctuary of a nondenominational, 
evangelical Christian church.19 The Does, a group of non-Christian students 
and their parents,20 challenged the school district’s nearly decade-old 
practice of holding high school graduation in the Elmbrook Church under 
the Establishment Clause.21 Although the court claimed that its decision 
was not “a broad statement about the propriety of governmental use of 
church-owned facilities,”22 ultimately, Elmbrook School District highlights 
the issue of governmental use of religious facilities and raises—but does 
 
16 See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 580, 599 (1992) (finding that prayers delivered by 
members of clergy at a public school graduation ceremony violated the Establishment Clause). 
17 See infra Part III. 
18 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Elmbrook Sch. Dist. v. Doe, No. 12-755 (U.S. filed Dec. 20, 
2012). 
19 687 F.3d 840, 843–44 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc). The court notes a discrepancy between the 
parties about how to properly label the space in which the graduation ceremonies took place, but the 
room is clearly a religious venue in which the Elmbrook Church “holds its weekend worship services.” 
Id. at 844 n.1. 
20 Id. at 847–48. 
21 Id. at 842, 844–45. 
22 Id. at 843 (“We do not speculate whether and when the sanctuary of a church, or synagogue, or 
mosque could hold public school ceremonies in a constitutionally appropriate manner.”); but see id. at 
862 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“I cannot accept, as a threshold matter, the majority’s view that its holding 
today is only a fact-specific application of these general principles and that this case is nothing more 
than the judicial analogue of an excursion ticket ‘good for this day and train only.’” (quoting Smith v. 
Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 669 (1944) (Roberts, J., dissenting))). 
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not clearly answer—the question: When, if ever, may the government 
constitutionally conduct business in a church?23 
Prior to the en banc hearing, the district court and a three-judge panel 
of the Seventh Circuit had both found that the school district’s practice of 
holding high school graduation ceremonies at Elmbrook Church did not 
violate the Establishment Clause.24 The en banc Seventh Circuit then 
reversed, finding that the school district’s controversial25 custom of 
renting26 the church facilities for graduation ceremonies and festivities27 
“convey[ed] an impermissible message of endorsement” accompanied by 
impermissible coercion in violation of the Establishment Clause.28 
The majority found the location of the graduation ceremony 
unconstitutional under the endorsement test and the coercion test. Writing 
for the en banc majority, Judge Flaum focused on the “indisputably and 
emphatically Christian” atmosphere of Elmbrook Church.29 The court made 
several references to the “proselytizing elements” at Elmbrook Church, 
such as banners appealing to children to join school ministries and a 15–20 
foot tall Latin cross—a preeminent symbol of Christianity that is “pregnant 
with expressive content.”30 This inventory of symbols added up, according 
to the majority, to an impermissible endorsement of religion as measured 
by a reasonable observer, in violation of the endorsement test interpretation 
of the Establishment Clause.31 The court did not provide a clear explanation 
of how this exposure to religious symbols and imagery “established” 
religion in violation of the First Amendment.32 
 
23 Note that throughout this Note the term “church” is used generally to include cathedrals, 
churches, gurdwaras, mosques, synagogues, temples, and other houses of worship. 
24 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 842; Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 710, 712 (7th Cir.), 
rev’d en banc, 687 F.3d 840 (7th Cir. 2011). 
25 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 847 (describing the almost immediate negative reaction to the 
practice coming from parents, the Freedom from Religion Foundation, the ACLU of Wisconsin, the 
Anti-Defamation League, and Americans United for Separation of Church and State). 
26 The District paid the Church a standard rental rate of $2000–$2200 for each graduation 
ceremony and $500–$700 for honors night. The money came from student fundraisers as well as the 
District’s general revenues. Id. at 845. 
27 One of the District’s two major high schools used a chapel in Elmbrook Church “for its senior 
honors night.” Id. at 844. 
28 Id. at 856. 
29 Id. at 845–47 (inventorying the Christian references, symbols, and interactions that students and 
guests saw and experienced during graduation festivities). 
30 Id. at 850–52 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 405 (1989)). 
31 Id. at 853–54; see Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); infra 
Part II. 
32 See Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 876 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The idea that mere exposure 
to religious imagery, with no accompanying proselytizing, is a form of religious establishment has no 
factual support, as well as being implausible.”). 
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The majority also found the school district’s use of Elmbrook Church 
to be impermissibly coercive33 under the coercion test articulated in Lee v. 
Weisman34 and Santa Fe v. Doe.35 Both of those cases focused on strong-
armed participation in a religious exercise—in those instances, prayer—as 
a violation of the Constitution.36 Although it called endorsement and 
coercion “two sides of the same coin,”37 the Elmbrook School District 
majority did not clearly articulate how the school district’s perceived 
endorsement of religion translated into coerced participation in a religious 
exercise. The ceremony at issue in Elmbrook School District did not 
involve overt religious activity (such as prayer), and the graduation 
ceremony itself was admittedly secular.38 Nevertheless, the majority found 
the practice unconstitutional under Lee and Santa Fe.39 In Elmbrook School 
District, the visibility of religious iconography and presence of church staff 
members in the “proselytizing environment” during the graduation 
ceremonies were foundational to the court’s reasoning.40 
Judge Ripple, joined by Chief Judge Easterbrook and Judge Posner, 
dissented. He took particular issue with the majority’s analysis under the 
coercion test.41 Judge Ripple argued that the majority’s reliance on a 
detailed account of the religious symbols in the Elmbrook Church 
suggested that a religious entity would have to become “a vanilla version of 
its real self” to pass the majority’s version of both the endorsement and 
coercion tests.42 The dissenters found Lee and Santa Fe distinguishable on 
the grounds that the graduation ceremony at issue in Elmbrook School 
District did not involve sponsorship, endorsement, or coercion of any 
religious activity.43 Judge Ripple doubted that students would “perceive the 
 
33 Id. at 854 (majority opinion). 
34 505 U.S. 577, 593–95, 598–99 (1992) (invalidating a practice of including prayers at high school 
graduation ceremonies on the grounds that participation was not truly voluntary and therefore 
constituted coerced participation in a religious exercise). 
35 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 301 (2000) (holding unconstitutional student-
led prayer at high school football games). 
36 Id. at 294; Lee, 505 U.S. at 580. 
37 See Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 855–56; see also id. at 870 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting) 
(criticizing the majority on this point). 
38 Id. at 864 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
39 Id. at 855 (majority opinion). 
40 See id. 
41 Id. at 862 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (predicting that the majority’s holding “may result in another 
form of coercion—the coercion of religious entities to conform to a judicially crafted notion of an 
acceptable ‘civil religion’”). 
42 Id. at 866. Judge Ripple anticipated that future applications of the majority’s approach would 
lead to the creation of a “civil religion” and a society in which even incidental contact with a 
“pervasively religious” organization would amount to impermissible coercion. Id. at 867. 
43 Id. at 863–64 (“[I]t certainly cannot be maintained that, like in Lee and in Santa Fe, [the 
graduating students and their guests] were coerced into participating, actively or passively, in any 
religious ceremony or activity.”). 
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same endorsement and the same coercion from the incidental presence of 
iconography, ornamentation and literature” as they would from the display 
of the Ten Commandments or the saying of a prayer in a public school 
classroom.44 He read the majority’s combined endorsement–coercion 
approach as overly broad (without “principled limitation”) and as 
inappropriately requiring judges to determine whether “a religious 
institution is too ‘pervasively religious’ to make any participation . . . 
between the institution and the civil community unconstitutionally 
coercive.”45 
Judge Ripple’s dissent disagreed with the majority’s endorsement test 
analysis, too. The court’s repeated references to the “pervasively” religious 
atmosphere and “proselytizing” nature of the Elmbrook Church setting 
indicated that perhaps a “less religious-looking” church (e.g., a Quaker 
meeting hall) would, in the majority’s view, be a constitutionally 
acceptable setting in which to hold a public high school graduation 
ceremony.46 This quantification of religiosity is new in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence and appears to go beyond the demands of the 
endorsement test.47 Boiling down the Establishment Clause to ask “how 
religious is too religious?” is a vague, discretionary standard that fails to 
provide clear guidance for future cases. Whether such an assessment of 
“sheer religiosity”48 would be limited to this type of momentous (and 
essentially mandatory) occasion is unclear. Graduation ceremonies are 
certainly not the only significant occasions in civil life, nor are they the 
only “effectively obligatory”49 events in the life of a high school student.50 
The majority did not explicitly limit its approach to the facts of the case, 
leaving open many questions about whether and how it would apply to 
other areas of public life, such as voting or small-town government 
meetings in houses of worship. 
In ruling against Elmbrook School District, the court emphasized its 
desire to avoid formalism in its application of precedents arising from 
situations in which religion came to the schoolhouse (e.g., in the form of 
classroom prayers) to this instance of a school activity occurring in a 
 
44 Id. at 864 (emphasis added). 
45 Id. at 866, 868 (“[T]oday’s holding requires that the state assume the affirmative obligation of 
avoiding any association with a ‘pervasively religious’ organization when that association would 
require an individual to be exposed—even incidentally and passively—to expressions of that 
organization’s ‘religiosity.’”). 
46 See id. at 866–67. 
47 See id. at 866. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ripple questioned whether this approach would 
mean that the “sheer religiosity” of symbols like a schoolteacher’s Star of David necklace or a Muslim 
teacher’s headscarf would constitute government endorsement of religion as well. Id. at 867. 
48 Id. at 853 (majority opinion). 
49 Id. at 854. 
50 See id. at 867 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (“What principled distinction does the court suggest to 
ensure that the approach it establishes in this case will not spread its dominion . . . ?”). 
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church.51 But the dissenters disagreed quite emphatically with the 
majority’s analogy to bringing church to the schoolhouse;52 they preferred 
instead to characterize the school district as a very temporary lessee of 
Elmbrook Church.53 The dissenters further argued that following the 
approach of this decision, judicial determination of whether a house of 
worship is “too religious” (such that it is “pervasively religious” and 
therefore violates the Establishment Clause as the location of a government 
activity) could easily lead to governmental preference for one “safe” or less 
aggressive religion over another.54 Such a preference (or “a jurisprudence 
of church furnishings”55) is precisely one of the outcomes that the 
Establishment Clause is designed to prevent. 
The way in which Doe v. Elmbrook School District will impact future 
cases (or choice of graduation venues) need not be as dire as the dissent 
predicted. As this discussion demonstrates, trying to work through the web 
of Supreme Court precedents and various tests used to interpret the 
Establishment Clause can be duplicative and confusing in a given case. 
Turning back to the original purposes of the Clause and its authors’ 
intentions may provide a more consistent approach to separating church 
and state and elucidate whether the Establishment Clause ever permits state 
activity in a house of worship.56 Developing a more consistent approach is 
especially important as the likelihood of government activity occurring in 
church increases. 
B. An Increasing Likelihood of Government Going to Church 
Founders’ comments and working drafts of what became the First 
Amendment suggest that the Establishment Clause was designed to protect 
 
51 Id. at 856 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (“[I]f constitutional doctrine teaches that a 
school cannot create a pervasively religious environment in the classroom, or at events it hosts, it 
appears overly formalistic to allow a school to engage in identical practices when it acts through a 
short-term lessee.”). 
52 See, e.g., id. at 874 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“It will not do to equate school activity at a church to 
church activities at a public school.”). 
53 See, e.g., id. at 865 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (making several references to the Church as a 
“landlord” and the District as a “tenant”); see also id. at 874 (Posner, J., dissenting) (“The difference 
between a public school’s using a church two or three hours a year and its using it a thousand-odd hours 
a year is one of degree rather than of kind, but differences of degree are inescapable grounds of legal 
distinctions.”). 
54 See id. at 868–69 (Ripple, J., dissenting); see also id. at 877–78 (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(predicting that if Elmbrook Church were not evangelical but instead a barer New England 
Congregational church the outcome of the case would change). 
55 Id. at 878 (Posner, J., dissenting). 
56 See Noah Feldman, From Liberty to Equality: The Transformation of the Establishment Clause, 
90 CALIF. L. REV. 673, 675 (2002) (“Only if we know why we want to separate church and state will 
we be able to give consistent, defensible answers to doctrinal questions about how we ought to go about 
separating church and state.”). 
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individual liberty of conscience—freedom of faith and morality.57 Under 
this reading, freedom from government-induced participation in a religious 
exercise is the cornerstone of what the Establishment Clause protects. If 
this is true, then can government activity occur in houses of worship so 
long as is it does not involve religious exercises? If the government may 
conduct business in religious spaces, does that make the church just another 
organ of the state? What if a high school student or voter or member of a 
civic association objects because his religion does not allow him to enter a 
certain type of religious building? Couldn’t such a religious transgression 
itself be characterized as a religious act? Already the streamlined “no 
coerced religious activity” interpretation of the Establishment Clause seems 
oversimplified and faces questions without easy or uniform answers. 
One alternative possibility is that the constitutionality of government 
activity taking place in a religious space depends in part upon the 
availability of secular spaces that could serve the same function. The 
Seventh Circuit suggested as much in Doe v. Elmbrook School District 
when it stated, “[I]f a church sanctuary were the only meeting place left in 
a small community ravaged by a natural disaster, we would confront a very 
different case.”58 A natural disaster, however, is not the only possible 
reason a church would be the only available forum: secular spaces that can 
host events of the magnitude of a high school graduation or presidential 
election-day polling are not as common as they once were. Participation in 
traditional secular, civic organizations is declining. 
The Establishment Clause demands a very fact-specific inquiry in each 
case. Some research suggests that the facts in an increasing number of 
cases may reveal a lack of secular facilities in which to conduct a range of 
government activities—events like school graduations, referenda or caucus 
meetings, park district classes, and voting. In some communities, 
government activities that once took place in a VFW hall or at a Lions Club 
post may now only be feasible in a “megachurch,” of which there are about 
1600 in the United States today.59 The average seating capacity of a 
megachurch60 is larger than many secular facilities, particularly in small 
towns. 
Simultaneously, participation in traditional civic and community 
organizations is declining. “[A]ctive involvement in community 
 
57 See infra Part III. 
58 687 F.3d at 843–44. 
59 See Fast Facts About American Religion, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RES., http://hirr.
hartsem.edu/research/fastfacts/fast_facts.html#mega (last visited Nov. 28, 2013). “Megachurch” is 
characterized in part as having a congregation of more than 2000 people in attendance weekly. Id. 
60 In a survey of 304 megachurches, the average seating capacity of the churches’ largest 
sanctuaries was “1,778, with a median of 1,500.” WARREN BIRD, LEADERSHIP NETWORK, & SCOTT 
THUMMA, HARTFORD INST. FOR RELIGION RESEARCH, A NEW DECADE OF MEGACHURCHES: 2011 
PROFILE OF LARGE ATTENDANCE CHURCHES IN THE UNITED STATES 4–5 (2011). 
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organizations” fell by 45% between 1985 and 1994.61 Between 1950 and 
1997, 4-H, “the nation’s largest youth development organization,”62 
experienced a 26% decline in membership.63 The global service network 
Lions Club International lost 58% of its members between 1967 and 
1997.64 The Masons, one of the oldest civic associations in the country 
(dating from 1733), lost a whopping 71% of their members between 1927 
and 1997.65 Together, these concurrent trends indicate that as civic 
associations shrink and lose their physical presences and megachurches 
swell in congregation size and overall numbers, the physical spaces 
available for large-group gatherings are increasingly religious. These trends 
suggest that courts may face an increasing number of cases like Doe v. 
Elmbrook School District, which arose because the school lacked a large 
enough air-conditioned space to host graduation. Although secular spaces 
were available for the Elmbrook graduation ceremonies,66 such alternatives 
will not be available in every community. Thus, the need for a clearer 
standard regarding when state activity may constitutionally occur in a 
house of worship is ever growing. In the face of the changing landscape of 
religious and secular participation, understanding the Establishment Clause 
as a safeguard of liberty of conscience is especially important, because 
physical intermingling of state activity and religious space may occur with 
more and more frequency. 
1. Other Examples of Government Activity in Church.—In Everson 
v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court asserted, “Neither [a state nor 
the federal government] can force nor influence a person to go to or to 
remain away from church against his will . . . .”67 Yet there are plenty of 
examples where people are forced to go to church—for instance, to 
exercise their constitutional right to vote, to comply with a court order to 
participate in a twelve-step rehabilitation program, or to participate in an 
event they are effectively required to attend, as was the case in Elmbrook 
School District. Are these blatant violations of the Establishment Clause? 
  
 
61 ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY 60 (2000). 
62 About 4-H, 4-H, http://www.4-h.org/about (last visited Nov. 28, 2013). 
63 PUTNAM, supra note 61, at 438. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. 
66 Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 844 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc), petition for cert. filed, 
No. 12-755 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2012). 
67 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). 
N O R T H W E S T E R N  U N I V E R S I T Y  L A W  R E V I E W 
294 
a. Voting: “The defining way that citizens participate in 
governing.”68—At least two federal circuit courts of appeals 
have allowed governments to use churches as polling places.69 
Additionally, several state statutes explicitly permit the use of religious 
spaces for polling, so long as any objector is allowed to vote by absentee 
ballot.70 In his concurring opinion in Elmbrook School District, Judge 
Hamilton distinguished voting from the impermissible high school 
graduation ceremony on several points. First, he noted that voting typically 
occurs “in non-consecrated parts of the church,” in contrast to the 
graduation ceremony, which took place in the sanctuary of Elmbrook 
Church.71 Second, churches are just some of the wide variety of public and 
private spaces in which voting occurs,72 whereas the graduation occurred in 
only one location. Finally, Judge Hamilton distinguished the private, 
individual act of voting in a voting booth from “a symbolic rite of passage” 
(like the graduation ceremony) and asserted that the risk of government 
endorsement is diminished in the former situation.73 
Judge Hamilton failed to account for the possibility that being in a 
church has a psychological effect on voters’ preferences.74 It is not clear 
that even if there were a measureable psychological effect, however, it 
would constitute coercion on the part of the government because casting a 
ballot would not be a religious act. Still, courts should consider whether 
churches as polling places commandeer individuals’ liberty of conscience. 
In doing so, they should be especially cognizant of the important place 
voting holds in American democracy and history as well as the possibility 
that casting one’s first ballot at age eighteen is its own rite of passage into 
adult citizenship. Courts should also recognize that voters cannot anticipate 
the impact the venue will have on the votes they cast when deciding 
whether to vote absentee or in person. The rise in early and absentee 
voting75 does not diminish the constitutional rights or concerns of those 
who continue to vote in person on Election Day. 
 
68 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 860 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
69 See Otero v. State Election Bd., 975 F.2d 738, 739 (10th Cir. 1992); Berman v. Bd. of Elections, 
420 F.2d 684, 686 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam). 
70 See, e.g., 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/19-1, 2 (West 2010 & Supp. 2013) (permitting all 
registered Illinois voters to vote by absentee ballot). 
71 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 859–60 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
72 Id. at 860. 
73 Id. 
74 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal & Terry L. Turnipseed, The Polling Place Priming (PPP) Effect: Is 
Voting in Churches (or Anywhere Else) Unconstitutional?, 91 B.U. L. REV. 561, 566 (2011). 
75 See Padmananda Rama, Record Number of Early Votes Expected Ahead of Election Day, NPR 
(Sept. 24, 2012, 5:43 PM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/itsallpolitics/2012/09/24/161701153/record-
number-of-early-votes-expected-ahead-of-election-day. 
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If “voting is the method by which we ‘share in the sovereignty of the 
state’ and which ‘ought to stand foremost in the estimation of the law,’”76 
courts should jealously guard it from a government-sponsored religious 
influence. With due respect to the march of time, exercising the right of 
suffrage is more consequential than high school graduation. That does not 
mean that polling and graduation ceremonies occurring in churches deserve 
separate “tests,” but rather that the inquiry about polling should be 
relatively more searching. As Chief Judge Easterbrook put it: 
If graduation in a church is forbidden because renting a religious venue 
endorses religion, and if endorsement is coercive, then renting a religious 
venue for voting must be equally unconstitutional. 
 . . . . 
 It is easier to justify graduation in a church than voting in a church. No one 
should feel obliged by conscience or faith to give up his influence in 
governance—and that’s what voting represents.77 
For these reasons, it should not be easier for polling to take place in a 
church than for a public high school graduation ceremony to take place 
there. Although high school graduation is “an integral part of American 
cultural life”78 and “[e]veryone knows that in our society and in our culture 
high school graduation is one of life’s most significant occasions,”79 voting 
represents the sole means by which most Americans participate in their 
own governance. Voting is a sacrosanct democratic activity. If and when 
polling takes place in a house of worship, judges ought to be particularly 
sensitive to the potential for influence on voters’ choices. The setting may 
impinge upon the conscience of the individual and the free choice that is 
the foundation of a democratic vote. All instances of government activity 
occurring in a house of worship should be analyzed within a framework in 
which the Establishment Clause is the protector of freedom of conscience. 
b. Twelve steps over the line?—Another example of an area in 
which government commonly intermingles with religion is court-mandated 
participation in drug or alcohol addiction recovery programs. The best 
known (and arguably, most effective80) approaches are the twelve-step 
programs administered by Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) and its offspring, 
Narcotics Anonymous (NA). Both have their origins in Christianity and are 
overtly religious models for addiction recovery.81 How can courts 
 
76 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 868 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (quoting 3 THE PAPERS OF 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 544–45 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1962)). 
77 Id. at 871–72 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting). 
78 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 583 (1992). 
79 Id. at 595. 
80 Apanovitch, supra note 12, at 786. 
81 See Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 480 (7th Cir. 1996) (“A straightforward reading of the twelve 
steps shows clearly that the steps are based on the monotheistic idea of a single God or Supreme 
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constitutionally mandate participation in such programs? As at least one 
district court has found, “Although AA is not a traditional form of religious 
worship, the First Amendment applies to ‘any religious activit[y] or 
institution[], whatever [it] may be called, or whatever form [it] may adopt 
to teach or practice religion.’”82 
According to some courts and commentators, judges cannot properly 
order participation in AA,83 at least not without offering completely secular 
alternatives.84 These courts insist that both the endorsement test and the 
coercion test prohibit mandatory participation in such twelve-step programs 
as the only rehabilitative option.85 Requiring secular alternatives comports 
with the understanding of the Establishment Clause as the protector of 
freedom of conscience. This dictate parallels the provisions in some state 
statutes that allow voters who object to casting their ballots in a house of 
worship to vote by absentee ballot instead. Though voting represents the 
fundamental way in which citizens participate in their democratic 
government, addiction rehabilitation represents an intensely personal, self-
reflective process. During that sensitive, searching process, individuals are 
particularly vulnerable to influence. In that situation, the government 
should be particularly wary of influencing rehabilitative program 
participants and their understanding of or belief in God. Courts, too, should 
be especially sensitive to Establishment Clause concerns in that context. 
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE DOCTRINE 
To assess the constitutionality of government activities taking place in 
houses of worship, judges need both a clearer understanding of the 
motivations behind the Establishment Clause and a clearer articulation of 
the proper analysis to apply from the Supreme Court. If the Establishment 
 
Being.”); ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS, A BRIEF GUIDE TO ALCOHOLICS ANONYMOUS 13 (1972) (listing 
the twelve steps of Alcoholics Anonymous, seven of which include references to God). But see id. at 10 
(“A.A. is not a religious organization. All members are free to decide on their own personal ideas about 
the meaning of life.”). 
82 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. Supp. 2d 950, 968 (W.D. Wis.) 
(quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947)), on reconsideration in part, 214 F. Supp. 2d 
905 (W.D. Wis. 2002), aff’d, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003). 
83 See, e.g., Griffin v. Coughlin, 673 N.E.2d 98, 105 (N.Y. 1996); Christopher M. Meissner, Note, 
Prayer or Prison: The Unconstitutionality of Mandatory Faith-Based Substance Abuse Treatment, 
54 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 671, 674–75 (2006) (arguing that drug courts cannot constitutionally assign 
unwilling offenders to residential twelve-step or otherwise religiously based treatment centers). 
84 But see Scott Roberts, The Constitutionality of Prison-Sponsored Religious Therapeutic 
Communities, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 69, 69 (2002) (defending the constitutionality of voluntary 
religious therapeutic communities in prisons and jails). 
85 See Emily M. Gallas, Comment, Endorsing Religion: Drug Courts and the 12-Step Recovery 
Support Program, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1063, 1083, 1095 (2004). But see Apanovitch, supra note 12, at 
789 (arguing that the coercion analysis allows impermissible relationships between the state and AA to 
persist and that the principle of separation of church and state should guide courts’ analysis of AA 
programs). 
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Clause focuses on liberty of conscience, as this Note suggests, it should be 
read with the other religion clause in the First Amendment: the Free 
Exercise Clause.86 A move toward interpreting the Establishment Clause in 
conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause might appear to be a significant 
doctrinal shift, especially because the Supreme Court has noted “that these 
two Clauses ‘often exert conflicting pressures’”87 and “that there can be 
‘internal tension . . . between the Establishment Clause and the Free 
Exercise Clause.’”88 However, an alternative reading of the two Clauses—
one where the Clauses buttress each other—would help reconcile 
precedents and develop an approach better suited to cases like Elmbrook 
School District in which a government entity conducts business in a house 
of worship. As the doctrine stands now, lower courts cannot know which of 
the Supreme Court’s holdings actually controls in Establishment Clause 
cases. 
A. Erecting a Wall: Everson v. Board of Education 
Starting with Everson v. Board of Education in 1947,89 modern 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence has lacked clear rules.90 In Everson, the 
Court adopted Thomas Jefferson’s phrasing to declare that the 
Establishment Clause was meant “to erect ‘a wall of separation between 
church and State’” that “must be kept high and impregnable.”91 In the same 
case that it announced this “wall of separation” (of which the Court “could 
not approve the slightest breach”92), the Court surprisingly held that the 
Clause permitted the state of New Jersey to use taxpayer funds to pay for 
parochial school bus fares.93 Justice Black focused the majority opinion on 
religious persecution as the motivating force behind the First Amendment.94 
He framed the Establishment Clause in terms of avoiding religious 
 
86 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or 
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”). 
87 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 702 (2012) 
(quoting Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 719 (2005)). 
88 Id. (omission in original) (quoting Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677 (1971) (plurality 
opinion)). 
89 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
90 See, e.g., Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 869 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Easterbrook, 
C.J., dissenting) (“If the current establishment-clause doctrine had been announced by Congress or an 
administrative agency, the Supreme Court would declare it unconstitutionally vague.”), petition for cert. 
filed, No. 12-755 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2012); Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 
13, 15, 17, 21 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (calling the Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence (among other things) “in shambles,” “confound[ing],” “impenetrable,” “little more 
than intuition and a tape measure,” and akin to a “ghoul”). 
91 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16, 18 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 
145, 164 (1879)). 
92 Id. at 18. 
93 Id. at 17. 
94 Id. at 8–12. 
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persecution,95 which gave short shrift to the broader understanding of the 
Clause as protecting liberty of conscience. The apparent inconsistency 
within the decision (between the stark language about the existence of a 
“wall of separation” and a holding that seemed to breach that wall) did not 
go unnoticed.96 
Everson began the still continuing inconsistency in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence. Some of the doctrinal confusion is due in part to the 
cursory understanding of the Establishment Clause encouraged by the 
simplified “wall of separation” approach. Forty-two years after Everson, in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Supreme Court again tried to make the 
demands of the Establishment Clause seem straightforward: “[G]overnment 
may not promote or affiliate itself with any religious doctrine or 
organization, may not discriminate among persons on the basis of their 
religious beliefs and practices, may not delegate a governmental power to a 
religious institution, and may not involve itself too deeply in such an 
institution’s affairs.”97 That succinct summary reflects the spirit (if not the 
exact text or practical realities98) of the Establishment Clause. But the 
Court’s precedents from before and after Allegheny reveal that application 
of the Clause to specific facts has been quite complicated.99 Ever since 
Everson, the doctrine of separation has been “enshrined” and revered.100 
Separation of church and state, however, is not necessarily the same as 
protecting individual freedom of conscience. Now, perhaps not 
surprisingly, the Court “is sharply divided on the standard governing 
Establishment Clause cases,”101 leading circuit courts to sometimes rely on 
their own precedents instead of the Supreme Court’s.102 
 
95 See Feldman, supra note 56, at 683–84 (arguing that Justice Black’s opinion distorted the 
eighteenth-century view by presenting liberty of conscience as a rationale for avoiding religious 
prosecution). 
96 See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 311–13 (1952) (recognizing that the First 
Amendment does not demand separation of church and state “in every and all respects,” for if it did, 
state and religion would be “hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly” “aliens to each other”). 
97 492 U.S. 573, 590–91 (1989) (footnotes omitted). 
98 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“A law may be one ‘respecting’ the 
forbidden objective [of the establishment of religion] while falling short of its total realization. . . . A 
given law might not establish a state religion but nevertheless be one ‘respecting’ that end in the sense 
of being a step that could lead to such establishment . . . .”). 
99 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, for example, the Court noted, “The language of the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment is at best opaque.” Id. 
100 HAMBURGER, supra note †, at 478. 
101 Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Duncan, 616 F.3d 1145, 1156 (10th Cir.), amended and superseded on 
reh’g sub nom. Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2010). 
102 See, e.g., id. 
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B. A Twist: The Lemon Test 
A transformative moment in Establishment Clause jurisprudence came 
with Lemon v. Kurtzman103 in 1971. In that case, the Supreme Court 
articulated the three-part “Lemon test,” which functioned as the dominant 
standard for several years, even though its precedential strength was 
doubted almost immediately by the Supreme Court itself.104 Under the 
Lemon test, statutes (1) “must have a secular legislative purpose,” (2) must 
not have a primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion, and (3) must 
not produce excessive entanglement of government with religion.105 
Each prong of the Lemon test problematically left open immediate, 
unanswered questions about definitions—for example, how to measure the 
“primary effect” of a statute.106 The Court recognized that the separation of 
church and state envisioned by the “wall of separation” view of the 
Establishment Clause is blurry and fact intensive.107 That recognition 
marked a distinct change from the definitive pronouncement of separate 
and discrete spheres of church and state announced in Everson. 
1. The Endorsement Test.—The prongs of the Lemon test eventually 
diverged into separate lines of reasoning, splitting into the modern 
jurisprudential tangle.108 In her concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,109 
Justice O’Connor first articulated the “endorsement test,” focusing chiefly 
on the “primary effect” and “excessive entanglement” prongs of Lemon.110 
The endorsement test asks whether a reasonable observer would interpret 
the government’s action to either endorse or denounce a particular religion. 
It turns on “whether a reasonable observer, apprised of the circumstances 
and history of the disputed governmental practice, would conclude that it 
 
103 403 U.S. at 614–15 (holding two state statutes unconstitutional on grounds of excessive 
entanglement, and noting that the Court’s previous holdings did not mandate “total separation between 
church and state” (and that such separation was impossible in an absolute sense)). 
104 See, e.g., Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973) (calling the Lemon test’s three prongs “no 
more than helpful signposts”). 
105 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13; see also Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. McCallum, 179 F. 
Supp. 2d 950, 966 (W.D. Wis.) (“[A] publically funded program does not violate the establishment 
clause if (1) it has a secular purpose; (2) it does not result in governmental indoctrination; (3) it does not 
define its participants by reference to religion; and (4) it does not create excessive entanglement.”), on 
reconsideration in part, 214 F. Supp. 2d 905 (W.D. Wis. 2002), aff’d, 324 F.3d 880 (7th Cir. 2003). 
106 See Cynthia V. Ward, Coercion and Choice Under the Establishment Clause, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 1621, 1627–29 (2006). 
107 Lemon, 403 U.S. at 614 (“[T]he line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, 
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.”). 
108 See Christopher J. Heaney, Note, Cooking Up a New Lemon Test: The Establishment Clause, 
Displays of Religious Objects, and Lessons from India, 10 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 559, 566–84 (2012). 
109 465 U.S. 668, 687–94 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 687 (majority opinion) (holding 
that a crèche included in the city of Pawtucket’s Christmas display was not a violation of the 
Establishment Clause). 
110 Id. at 689–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval of religious faith.”111 The 
endorsement test quickly became the Supreme Court’s dominant approach 
to interpreting the Lemon test and the Establishment Clause.112 Like Lemon, 
it also came under fire for being elusive due to the always hard-to-define 
“reasonable person” standard.113 However, asking whether a reasonable 
observer would perceive endorsement in a particular activity or message is 
not necessarily too vague a constitutional test. Particularly in the context of 
religion, where the spectrum of nonbelievers and faithful is so varied and 
broad, inquiring about a “reasonable” person may be the only way to come 
to a consensus about a given set of facts in which government and religion 
overlap. 
2. The Coercion Test.—Despite the fact that the three prongs of the 
Lemon test had fractured, the Court refused to directly reconsider it in 
1992, when the Court heard Lee v. Weisman.114 Nonetheless, the Court 
seemed to announce a new test that centered on coerced religious 
activity.115 Justice Kennedy originally introduced the concept of coercion in 
his opinion in County of Allegheny v. ACLU in 1989.116 In Allegheny, the 
Court applied the endorsement test from Lynch to find that a standalone 
crèche117 placed in a position of prominence in the county government 
building violated the Establishment Clause.118 Concurring in part of the 
judgment and dissenting in part, Justice Kennedy articulated two “distinct 
[but] not unrelated” limiting principles present in the Court’s precedents: 
(1) “government may not coerce anyone to support or participate in any 
religion or its exercise” and (2) government “may not . . . give direct 
benefits to religion” such that it effectively establishes a state religion.119 
Justice Kennedy focused on the coercion concept as the crux of the 
Establishment Clause inquiry,120 and introduced the idea of direct versus 
 
111 Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 857 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Hamilton, J., 
concurring), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-755 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2012). 
112 See Feldman, supra note 56, at 698 (noting that as of 2002, every member of the then-current 
Court had accepted the endorsement test as “the test”). 
113 See, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 800 n.5 (1995) 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (agreeing to the relevance of an endorsement analysis but criticizing Justice 
O’Connor’s articulation of the “reasonable observer”). 
114 505 U.S. 577, 587, 599 (1992) (holding that a prayer delivered by a member of the clergy at a 
high school graduation violated the Establishment Clause). 
115 See Elizabeth Barker Brandt, Lee v. Weisman: A New Age for Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence?, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 535, 535 (1993) (noting that Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion did not conduct an identifiable application of the Lemon test). 
116 492 U.S. 573, 659–62 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in 
part). 
117 The term “crèche” refers to a Christmas nativity scene. 
118 Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 601–02. 
119 Id. at 659 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
120 Id. at 662 (“Absent coercion, the risk of infringement of religious liberty by passive or symbolic 
accommodation is minimal.”). 
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indirect coercion. In suggesting that even the latter could violate the 
Establishment Clause, Kennedy’s opinion foreshadowed Lee.121 
The coercion test asks whether a government actor has induced or 
compelled participation in a religious exercise. Coercion is not the same as 
indoctrination, which typically evokes some kind of conversion. Coercion 
does not demand that much; it refers to “forced” involvement in a religious 
act, including effectively required participation short of literal demand. This 
test tracks most closely with the idea of liberty of conscience embodied in 
the Establishment Clause. In Lee, where the Court considered the issue of 
prayer delivered by clergy at a graduation ceremony, the Court reasoned, 
“[I]f citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State 
disavows its own duty to guard and respect that sphere of inviolable 
conscience and belief which is the mark of a free people.”122 The coercion 
test thus most faithfully resembles James Madison’s understanding of the 
Establishment Clause as functioning to protect the free exercise of 
religion,123 because it focuses on whether the government is impinging 
upon liberty of conscience—the freedom to choose for oneself whether and 
how to relate to some higher being. 
To fail the coercion test, a government entity need not forcibly compel 
actual participation in a religious act.124 Indeed, in Lee, the Court faced a 
situation of “indirect coercion”125 because attendance at graduation was not 
compulsory—nor was actual participation in the prayer. To some extent, 
the Court effectively gleaned government coercion from peer pressure. 
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented on this point; he took particular issue 
with the majority’s assertion that psychological pressure to stand or at least 
observe respectful silence during the graduation prayer would indicate 
participation in the religious exercise, and therefore impermissibly coerce 
participation.126 The Court nonetheless held that government cannot include 
a religious activity or ritual, such as prayer, in an event at which attendance 
is virtually—including socially—obligatory, such as the graduation 
ceremonies at issue in Lee and Elmbrook School District.127 
 
121 Id. at 660–61. See Ward, supra note 106, at 1630–32. 
122 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992). 
123 See infra Part III; see also Andy G. Olree, “Pride Ignorance and Knavery”: James Madison’s 
Formative Experiences with Religious Establishments, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 211, 213–14 
(2013). 
124 See Lee, 505 U.S. at 593 (calling the pressure to stand or at least remain silent during a prayer at 
a high school graduation ceremony “subtle and indirect” but capable of being “as real as any overt 
compulsion”). 
125 Ward, supra note 106, at 1626 (emphasis omitted). 
126 Lee, 505 U.S. at 636–38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
127 Id. at 596 (majority opinion) (noting “the fact that attendance at the graduation ceremonies is 
voluntary in a legal sense does not save the religious exercise”). The Court distinguished Marsh v. 
Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where nine years earlier it had upheld the practice of beginning state 
legislative sessions with a prayer. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 596–97. 
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Coercion might seem dependent on government endorsement of 
religion128 because a message of government sponsorship or approval 
influences the perception of whether one is actually free to abstain from 
participating in a religious act. Understanding coercion and endorsement 
together in this way is a more wholesale inquiry into whether the location 
and content of a government activity impinge upon liberty of conscience. 
Yet the relationship between endorsement and coercion is doctrinally 
unclear.129 In the 2009 case Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, the Supreme 
Court indicated that endorsement differs from coercion.130 In Elmbrook 
School District, Judge Ripple in dissent criticized the majority for failing to 
clearly articulate the connection between endorsement and coercion.131 The 
Seventh Circuit had previously stated a straightforward test for coercion, 
which lacked any reference to endorsement, in Kerr v. Farrey. In 1996, the 
court wrote, “In our view, when a plaintiff claims that the state is coercing 
him or her to subscribe to religion . . . only three points are crucial: first, 
has the state acted; second, does the action amount to coercion; and third, is 
the object of the coercion religious or secular?”132 In light of this confusion 
and inconsistency, returning to the original understanding133 of the First 
Amendment offers a clearer way to approach Establishment Clause cases 
that arise both when government goes to church and when religion enters a 
government sphere. 
III. ORIGINS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
The Religion Clauses appear first in the First Amendment for a reason: 
liberty of religious conscience was the first-recognized individual, 
inalienable right.134 When the Bill of Rights was ratified in 1791, eight out 
of fourteen states included Establishment Clause analogs in their state 
 
128 See Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 866 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Ripple, J., 
dissenting) (“[The Establishment Clause] protects the individual from the government’s coercing him, 
because of governmental endorsement, to join or participate actively or passively in the activity of any 
religion.”), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-755 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2012). 
129 Id. at 871 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting) (“[T]he government’s expression of its own views does 
not coerce anyone else to do anything . . . .”). 
130 555 U.S. 460, 481 (2009) (holding that the placement of permanent monuments in a public park 
is a form of government speech). 
131 See Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 862–63 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 (2000); Lee, 505 U.S. at 587). 
132 Kerr v. Farrey, 95 F.3d 472, 479 (7th Cir. 1996). 
133 Focusing on original intent is an increasingly popular method of constitutional interpretation. 
See Brian A. Lichter & David P. Baltmanis, Foreword: Original Ideas on Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. 
REV. 491, 491 (2009). See generally Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living 
Constitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009). 
134 Calabresi et al., supra note 14. 
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constitutions.135 The emphasis on being free from established religion has 
been significant and enduring since the earliest days of the Constitution. 
George Washington believed that religion and morality were 
indispensable to political prosperity,136 and “thought it proper, accordingly, 
to support and endorse religious sentiments that support the common 
good.”137 This is not to suggest that Washington disapproved of the 
disestablishment directive in the Establishment Clause. It does, however, 
illustrate that what many contemporary jurists, scholars, and citizens 
consider the command of the Establishment Clause—namely, a 
hermetically sealed separation between religion and government—was not 
the uniform understanding of the proper relationship between faith and 
governance when the First Amendment was adopted in 1791.138 
In contrast to Washington, James Madison, the principal author of the 
First Amendment, “denounced the idea that religion should be promoted 
because it is conducive to good citizenship.”139 He “objected to the 
establishment of religion” in part because of “political alienation”—it 
“degrades from the equal rank of Citizens all those whose opinions in 
Religion do not bend to those of the Legislative authority.”140 Madison also 
feared for “the corruption of religion itself” that might result from 
establishment.141 
Thomas Jefferson did not condone government endorsement of 
religion either. His famous language about the “wall of separation” spurred 
the dominant contemporary understanding of the Establishment Clause.142 
Although the Establishment Clause itself mentions no such separation 
(commanding only that “Congress shall make no law respecting an 
 
135 Id. at 1472. 
136 Vincent Phillip Muñoz, Religion and the Common Good: George Washington on Church and 
State, in THE FOUNDERS ON GOD AND GOVERNMENT, supra note 2, at 1, 6. 
137 Id. at 18; see also FRANK LAMBERT, THE FOUNDING FATHERS AND THE PLACE OF RELIGION IN 
AMERICA 259–60 (2003) (highlighting Washington’s “hope that civic responsibility would accompany 
religious freedom in the new republic” and belief in the importance of churches as the foundation of 
good government and promoters of republican virtues). 
138 For example, in Everson v. Board of Education, four Supreme Court justices agreed that “[the 
Establishment Clause] was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of religious 
activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of public aid or support for 
religion.” 330 U.S. 1, 31–32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., joined by Frankfurter, Jackson & Burton, JJ., 
dissenting). 
139 Andrew Koppelman, Phony Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
727, 747 (2009). 
140 Id. (quoting James Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments 
(1785), reprinted in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES 
MADISON 10–11 (Marvin Meyers ed., rev. ed. 1981)). 
141 Id. 
142 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Messrs. Nehemiah Dodge, Ephraim Robbins & Stephen S. 
Nelson, supra note †; see also HAMBURGER, supra note †, at 2–3 (noting the disparity between 
disestablishment and separation of church and state). 
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establishment of religion”143), the Supreme Court notably adopted 
Jefferson’s notion of such rigid separation in the 1947 case Everson v. 
Board of Education.144 In doing so, the Court did not simply adopt a 
reading of the Establishment Clause different from the literal text. For the 
first time, it explicitly declared a constitutional right to separation of church 
and state, a First Amendment freedom.145 Even though the Court has 
transitioned away from that rigid formulation of separate spheres for 
religion and government,146 uncertainty remains regarding how far 
separated church and state must be. This uncertainty is not surprising given 
that the “wall of separation” did not even exist during Jefferson’s time. 
Indeed, Congress “provid[ed] for paid [c]haplains for the House and 
Senate” during the First Session of the First Congress.147 
Draft versions of the First Amendment Religion Clauses referred 
explicitly to conscience.148 James Madison’s first draft proposal for what 
became the Establishment Clause read, “The civil rights of none shall be 
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national 
religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be 
in any manner, or on any pretext, infringed.”149 Even after the word 
“conscience” disappeared from drafts of the Amendment, this Lockean150 
idea of freedom of conscience remained of paramount importance.151 Both 
coerced religious exercise and preferential systems favoring one religion 
over another would violate freedom of conscience.152 
Liberty of conscience is inherent in the Free Exercise Clause 
(“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise [of 
religion]”153). One way to analyze Establishment Clause cases in a way that 
is motivated by liberty of conscience is to view the Establishment Clause in 
pari materia with the Free Exercise Clause rather than as an isolated 
command. Recent insights gleaned from documents relating to the 
ratification debate support this idea that the prohibition on establishment 
 
143 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
144 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
145 See HAMBURGER, supra note †, at 449, 455. 
146 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (“Some relationship between 
government and religious organizations is inevitable.”). 
147 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 674 (1984). 
148 Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346, 
399–404 (2002). 
149 Id. at 402 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Joseph Gales ed., 1789)). 
150 For a survey of the theoretical underpinnings of the Establishment Clause (and John Locke’s 
influence in particular), see id. at 372–98. 
151 Id. at 401–04; see also HAMBURGER, supra note †, at 92–107 (describing American religious 
dissenters’ focus on freedom from legislation inhibiting religious exercise, including explicit references 
to “rights of conscience”). 
152 Feldman, supra note 148, at 405. 
153 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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was meant to protect the free exercise of religion.154 Viewing the 
Establishment Clause in this way comports with the understanding that 
members of the founding generation wanted to bar the federal government 
from one fundamental transgression: compelling conscience. In particular, 
the Founders feared that the government would levy taxes for religious 
purposes, in violation of dissenters’ liberty of conscience—their freedom of 
thought and morality.155 
This interpretation is consistent with the motivations of James 
Madison, “the leading architect of the religion clauses.”156 Madison 
believed that the “‘free exercise of religion’ was impossible as long as a 
religious establishment continued because establishment insiders could 
never be trusted to leave dissenters alone.”157 “For Madison, there could be 
no such thing as a legal system that protected religious liberty while also 
establishing religion.”158 Understanding the Establishment Clause as a 
means to give effect and meaning to the Free Exercise Clause reconciles 
Jefferson’s idea of a “wall of separation” with the reality of some 
intermingling of church and state, which has been present in the United 
States since the First Congress. 
IV. DIVINING A TEST 
This understanding of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses 
working together to protect liberty of conscience is notably absent from the 
current Establishment Clause doctrine. Given the split approaches that 
followed Lemon, the remaining precedential significance of that case is 
unclear.159 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality opinion in the 2005 case Van 
 
154 See Feldman, supra note 148; Natelson, supra note 4, at 88–90; see also Glaser, supra note 1, at 
1059 (footnote omitted) (“The First Amendment was not designed to protect citizens from religion, but 
to protect religion from government interference. Some laws aimed at protecting the free exercise of 
religion require a purpose that is not primarily ‘secular.’”). 
155 Feldman, supra note 148, at 351–52, 399 (“The primary reason not to have an established 
religion, then, was the protection of liberty of conscience of dissenters.”). 
156 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694, 703 (2012) 
(quoting Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1446 (2011)). 
157 Olree, supra note 123, at 271. 
158 Id. at 276. 
159 The Lemon test is disfavored by many, and many thought it gone only to see it rise again. See, 
e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 (1993) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its 
grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence once again . . . . The secret of the Lemon test’s survival, I think, is that it is so easy 
to kill.”). In Lamb’s Chapel, Justice Scalia pointed directly to several concurring and dissenting 
opinions that delivered what should have been fatal blows to Lemon, including parts of Lee v. Weisman, 
505 U.S. 577 (1992); County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989); Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981); New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977); Roemer v. Board 
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Orden v. Perry160 explicitly rejected an application of the Lemon test to a 
“passive monument” on the Texas State Capitol grounds, in favor of an 
analysis based on the “nature of the monument” and “our Nation’s 
history.”161 Still, references to the Lemon test continue to appear in circuit 
court decisions. For example, the Seventh Circuit treated it as a given that a 
governmental practice in a house of worship violates the First Amendment 
“if it lacks a legitimate secular purpose.”162 Such a practice is 
unconstitutional if it has the primary effect of communicating government 
endorsement or disapproval of religion.163 
One way to reconcile these precedents might be to think of them in 
terms of the “state action” doctrine—the government cannot instigate, 
encourage, or coerce religious activity, but must welcome religious activity 
that is the result of private judgment in the public sphere.164 This is 
consistent with the understanding that liberty of conscience underlies both 
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Most importantly, 
courts should assess constitutionality in terms of whether the government 
action impinges upon an individual’s ability to make her own decisions 
about morality and religion. 
This approach is especially useful for (though not limited to) situations 
in which government activity occurs in a house of worship, like in Doe v. 
Elmbrook School District. Requiring people to enter a church to participate 
in a government activity—be it high school graduation, voting, or 
something else—immediately raises the question of whether those people 
can truly exercise their liberty of conscience in that setting. Reading the 
two Religion Clauses together, and honing in on liberty of conscience as 
the motivation behind both, would move the focus away from the inventory 
of religiosity that occurred in Elmbrook,165 while not doing away with it 
entirely. A message of endorsement (understood as such, perhaps, because 
of an abundance of religious icons) can still inform a court about whether a 
 
of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); and Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v. 
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973). Id. But see Penny J. Meyers, Note, Lemon Is Alive and Kicking: Using 
the Lemon Test to Determine the Constitutionality of Prayer at High School Graduation Ceremonies, 
34 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 233 (1999) (arguing that the Lemon test provides the best way to protect 
individual freedom and separation of church and state). 
160 545 U.S. 677, 681–83 (2005) (plurality opinion) (holding that a six-foot-tall depiction of the 
Ten Commandments on the Texas State Capitol grounds, as part of an array of twenty-one historical 
markers and seventeen monuments on the grounds, did not violate the Establishment Clause). 
161 Id. at 686. 
162 Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 861–62 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (Ripple, J., 
dissenting) (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)), petition for cert. filed, No. 12-
755 (U.S. Dec. 20, 2012). 
163 See id. (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 308 (2000); Lynch v. Donnelly, 
465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
164 Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus on the Line 
Between Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 682 (2001). 
165 See Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 851–54. 
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reasonable person would experience coercion of conscience. The 
constitutionality of state activity in a house of worship ought not turn only 
on an assessment of how religious the religious space is. Simply taking an 
inventory of religiosity fails to truly confront what makes one physical 
location coercive and another not. Still, some assessment of “religiosity” 
may be relevant for purposes of deciding whether a reasonable person 
would be unduly influenced by those surroundings to the point of 
impinging his freedom to make moral and religious judgments. This 
comports with the understanding that the Establishment Clause was meant 
as a guarantor of individual freedom of conscience.166 
None of the Supreme Court precedents articulating glosses on the 
Lemon test arose in a context like Doe v. Elmbrook School District in 
which the state went to church; instead, they were all situations in which 
some element of religion entered a government “space,” either physical or 
ceremonial.167 That distinction affects the analysis under any given test, but 
does not require a wholly different standard—the First Amendment makes 
no distinction based on physical location of the impermissible 
intermingling of government and religion. Furthermore, these tests are all 
judicial creations; indeed, the First Amendment says nothing explicitly 
about government endorsing religion (or lack thereof) or coercing 
participation therein (or precluding such participation).168 Still, a test that 
focuses on coercion, informed by any perceived messages of endorsement, 
perhaps best reflects the Founders’ concern with liberty of conscience and 
their conception of the Establishment Clause as a method by which to 
protect the Free Exercise Clause. 
A. Liberty of Conscience Applied to Government Activity in Church 
In addition to high school graduation ceremonies, voting and court-
ordered rehabilitation are just two examples of junctions between 
government and religion. They help to illustrate that just as was the case at 
the Founding, when Congress began funding the Capitol chaplain, church 
and state are not entirely distinct entities. These examples further illustrate 
just how important it is to develop a more comprehensive and coherent 
view of the Establishment Clause because of the large number of 
circumstances in which government and religion interact. Courts should 
read the Establishment Clause in conjunction with the Free Exercise Clause 
because they both grew out of the same belief in a right to liberty of 
conscience. 
A critical distinction underlying a liberty of conscience-centered test 
for the Establishment Clause is that government activity occurring in a 
 
166 See supra Part III. 
167 See supra Part II. 
168 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 869 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting) (noting that Lemon and the 
endorsement tests are not “restatements of the [F]irst [A]mendment’s meaning”). 
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house of worship is not exactly the same as religious activity taking place 
in a school or another government-owned building. In the former scenario, 
even acting as a temporary tenant of a church may indicate some 
government approval or endorsement of religion; it immediately raises the 
possibility that the state is impinging on individuals’ liberty of conscience 
by effectively forcing them to enter a religious space. That heightened 
sensitivity demands an especially nuanced understanding of what 
constitutes religious activity. In contrast, when religion enters a civic space, 
such as a religious student club, people may feel freer to abstain from the 
religious practice because they are in neutral or secular physical 
surroundings. In any event, the Supreme Court should articulate clear 
guiding principles within which lower court judges can exercise their 
reasoned judgment with respect to specific facts, either by granting 
certiorari in Elmbrook School District or addressing a similar case. The 
Court should refocus lower courts’ inquiries on unbridled morality and 
faith, asking whether a particular practice limits attendees’ ability to form 
free thoughts about religion, without government interference. 
The government cannot effectively “require[] participation in a 
religious exercise” without violating the Establishment Clause (and the 
Free Exercise Clause).169 Such blatant coercion is a definitive violation of 
the spirit of the Establishment Clause, as evidenced by its purpose of 
protecting liberty of conscience. Chief Judge Easterbrook referenced this 
original purpose in his dissenting opinion in Elmbrook School District. He 
wrote, “The actual Establishment Clause bans laws respecting the 
establishment of religion—which is to say, taxation for the support of a 
church, the employment of clergy on the public payroll, and mandatory 
attendance or worship.”170 Recognizing the doctrinal move away from the 
original idea of liberty of conscience to separation of church and state helps 
to explain the other perceived purposes of the Establishment Clause that the 
Supreme Court and lower courts continue to apply. 
Re-centering Establishment Clause analysis on its protection of liberty 
of conscience will streamline courts’ inquiries. Courts should ask: was a 
reasonable person’s liberty of conscience impinged upon because this 
activity occurred in this space? Liberty of conscience means freedom to 
decide for oneself what is morally right and one’s relationship with, or the 
existence of, a higher being. The Establishment Clause certainly “forbids 
coercive pressure on an individual to support or to participate in a religious 
activity.”171 But forced participation in religious activity is not the only 
potential violation of the Establishment Clause. Focusing the analysis on 
“no unreasonable impingement on liberty of conscience” would maintain 
 
169 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 594 (1992). 
170 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 869 (Easterbrook, C.J., dissenting). 
171 Id. at 862 (Ripple, J., dissenting) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 312 
(2000); Lee, 505 U.S. at 587, 592–93). 
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the spirit of each prong of the Lemon test without causing the avalanche of 
separate tests that followed from it. Of course, this streamlined inquiry is 
not perfect, and it leaves room for argument, particularly about what 
constitutes “religious activity” and what would make a “reasonable” 
person’s conscience impermissibly influenced by the government. 
In assessing whether a government activity occurring in a house of 
worship is coercive in this sense, the part of the church in which the state 
activity occurs may be informative.172 But divining constitutionality solely 
from a floor plan is neither instructive nor practical. Even in a 
jurisprudential context as requisitely fact-specific as the Establishment 
Clause, definitively permitting government to conduct its business in a 
fellowship hall devoid of religious icons, but not a chapel, would invite an 
even bigger mess.173 
In assessing whether participating in a government activity in the same 
physical space as those icons and materials would impinge upon a 
reasonable person’s liberty of conscience, courts should question whether 
exposure to religious icons or proselytizing materials is “incidental” to the 
secular activity. Although “[w]e require far more than proximity before we 
vitiate civil–religious relationships on the ground of endorsement, symbolic 
union or coercion,”174 physical proximity or intermingling does matter 
when we think about the degree of influence religious symbols may carry. 
That is not to say that “pervasively religious” institutions can never host the 
civil polity, as Judge Ripple feared in Elmbrook School District.175 It 
merely demonstrates that under a “no unreasonable impingement on liberty 
of conscience” standard, such pervasively religious buildings may or may 
not be constitutionally permissible venues for government activity. 
The constitutionality of state activity in church cannot turn on 
availability of space176 because the fact that a religious space is convenient 
or accommodating does not affect whether a reasonable person’s liberty of 
conscience would be impinged upon by the person’s presence in that space 
to take part in the activity. The text of the Establishment Clause does not 
demand such distinctions. Precisely because the motivations behind the 
Establishment Clause are so difficult to apply to specific facts, its 
 
172 See, e.g., id. at 860 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (distinguishing impermissible use of a church 
sanctuary for high school graduations from permissible use of churches as polling places (citing Otero 
v. State Election Bd., 975 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1992))). 
173 One can easily imagine future disagreements. If a smaller congregation uses a larger church’s 
youth lounge for weekly worship, is the youth lounge safely secular for use by a government entity, or 
is it a worship space in which civic activities like high school graduation ceremonies may not occur? 
174 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 864 (Ripple, J., dissenting). 
175 See id. at 866. 
176 But see id. at 860 (Hamilton, J., concurring) (referring to the use of houses of worship as polling 
places and noting the “sometimes frantic effort to find enough places willing to put up with the traffic 
and disruption that go with running an election”). 
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protections are particularly vulnerable to subtle erosion.177 It is therefore 
paramount to avoid “[t]he hazards of placing too much weight on a few 
words or phrases of the Court.”178 Just as the Founders “recognized that 
even the best intentions of people of faith can lead to division, exclusion, 
and worse,”179 so, too, can the intentions of government actors. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note has attempted to articulate a constitutionally sound and 
straightforward standard for assessing the constitutionality of government 
activity occurring in houses of worship. The point is not to suggest a 
“single mechanical formula that can accurately draw the constitutional line 
in every case.”180 No such mechanical test exists, nor would it be wise to 
formulate one here. The point is to rescue the proper Establishment Clause 
inquiry from purgatory and re-inject it with its original promise. In 
attempting to do so, this Note demonstrates the unique challenges of 
applying the Establishment Clause to government activity that occurs in 
houses of worship. 
Government activity in church is not a definitive sin under the 
Establishment Clause. However, the original concern for freedom of 
conscience is especially important when government goes to church. One 
reason is that even entering a house of worship could be a sin to believers 
of certain faiths.181 Centering Establishment Clause analysis on whether the 
government unreasonably impinges upon liberty of conscience reflects the 
Framers’ intentions for the Establishment Clause, as well as the concerns 
articulated in the three prongs of the Lemon test and its offspring, including 
the endorsement and coercion tests. Reframing Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence to support the liberty protected by the Free Exercise Clause 
does not ignore Jefferson’s conception of the wall of separation between 
church and state, but it does reject the notion of entirely distinct spheres of 
operation. Whether the Establishment Clause blesses state activity in 
church hinges not on physical space alone, but on whether the activity 
involves government influence over religious participation and the 




177 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
178 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 670 (1970). 
179 Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d at 861 (Hamilton, J., concurring). 
180 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 699 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
181 For example, members of the Orthodox Jewish faith are restricted from entering non-Jewish 
houses of worship. See Berman v. Bd. of Elections, 420 F.2d 684, 684 (2d Cir. 1969) (per curiam). 
